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ABSTRACT
TO WHO OR WHAT DO WE OWE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?
A SEARCH FOR AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
by
Mia SOderlund
This thesis focuses on the ethical dimension of sustainable development as described in
the Bruntland report. According to this report, we do have certain moral obligations to
future generations. This thesis asks whether traditional moral philosophy, such as
utilitarian and contractarian theories, can justify moral obligations to future generations,
and if they can serve as ethical frameworks for sustainable development.
The basic idea with sustainable development is to create a balance between
society, the environment and the economy. If the environment is ascribed instrumental
value, which is the case with traditional moral philosophy then there is no balance,
because its value are based on whatever value the society and the economy is willing to
give the environment.
I will argue that the proper ethical framework for sustainable development is an
ethical framework, based on Aldo Leopold's land ethic. This framework gives the
environment a value on its own regardless to its usefulness to humans, which makes it
possible to justify sustainable development as a balance between the economy, society
and, the environment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"One need not be a philosopher to be concerned for ethics; however, one must be
concerned to submit one's moral values and judgments to rigorous intellectual scrutiny."
J. Ronald Engel, Ethics of Environment & Development, 1993
1.1 Overview
We are dependent on our surrounding environment to sustain humanity on earth. This is
ancient knowledge that all societies and cultures throughout history have known. Farmers
have always known that they must save their seeds, plant them, and care for their fields in
order to keep their land productive. Theodore Roosevelt's progressive conservation
movement, led by Gifford Pinchot, the first director of the U.S. Forest Service, was based
on the same knowledge. Nearly a century ago Pinchot introduced a policy based on
conservation and equitable distribution of public resources—and thereby assured a
"sustainable yield" of timber from national forests that would serve future generations of
Americans.'
People have always affected their surrounding environment, even though they
might not have been aware to what extent. The first human societies, which were hunters
and gatherers, affected their environment even though they were nomads and few in
number. Approximately 10,000 years ago, the hunter and gatherer societies developed
11
12
agrarian societies. At that time, the world population was less than one thousandth of
what it is today, about 5 million compared to today's 6 billion. In today's highly
technological civilization, each individual uses 150 times more energy than an individual
in the hunter and gatherer societies. 2
 With a thousand times more people using 150 times
more energy, each and every one of us puts a large burden on the earth's resources, and
our effects have never been greater. The rapid increase in human population, relative to
resources and environmental resilience, makes it difficult to continue the upward spiral of
development and economic growth.
However, it would be impossible for modern civilizations to return to a hunter-
gatherer society. Modern civilizations have become too complex, the means we have
devised for our survival and comfort too intricate, and our manipulation of nature too
labyrinthine to extricate ourselves from a lifestyle which is totally dependent on science
and technology.
Somehow we must adopt policies regarding population and development that are
consistent with policies to ensure our survival, and which take into account the capacity
of the environment so that it can renew itself. Fortunately, there is a growing concern
among people today about promoting policies that deal with the distribution of natural
resources, pollution, population growth, development, and the state of the earth. Perhaps
the best example is the Bruntland report, named after its chairwoman, Gro Harlem
Bruntland, former prime minister of Norway.' In 1987 the Bruntland report thrust the
concept of sustainable development into the mainstream of political and economic
discourse around the world. "Humanity has the ability to make development
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sustainable—to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs."'
Sustainable development is, in its broader sense, a plea for posterity, and as such,
it is not a new idea. I have already given two examples of posterity arguments—the
farmer's knowledge and Pinchot's forest conservation. However, the specific concept of
sustainable development is a relatively new idea. Since the mid 1980s, there has been a
lively discussion both about definitions of sustainable development and about how to
make sustainable development work in practice. However, the description put forward by
the Brundtland report is still the predominant one, since it is simple and many different
groups can be united under its umbrella.
Many books and articles have been written over the past ten years about
sustainable development. Most of this literature focuses on the social, political, and
economic effects of sustainable development. A series of conferences has taken place on
the theme of sustainable development, and numerous environmental organizations,
industries, and governments all over the world are working on promoting sustainable
development.
It seems to me that there is a consensus that we all have to change and move in a
more sustainable direction of economic growth and development. We have to face the
effects our actions have on the natural environment. And we have to change our behavior
for the future. However, the precise nature of the change and what this change implies is
controversial. Some argue that the path to sustainable development is through the
development of new technology and science, whereas others believe that we have to take
a "giant step" which reaches deep to modify both our culture and our behavior.'
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It is my position in this thesis that sustainable development requires a
fundamental change in our beliefs and values. I believe a profound change in our
behavior is necessary to solve the problems of climate change, population growth,
pollution, erosion, poverty, and global inequality. In order to change behavior we have to
change our beliefs and values.
Perhaps people are slowly but steadily beginning to assume the moral
responsibility for protecting the environment and to accept the limitations that such a
responsibility imposes on our habits of consumption and use of resources. Perhaps
sustainable development is a response to the growing awareness of the effects that human
activities have on the earth—a change of beliefs and values.
Philosopher Nicholas Sosa discusses three necessary steps, that we all have to
take in order to change our behavior effectively.' First, the public must be informed about
the natural environment and the crisis it is now undergoing. Second, we need to know
what sort of world lies ahead and ask ourselves: What sort of world do we want to strive
to realize? Third, we need to revise our way of living. If sustainable development is what
our human civilization should aim for, then we need to review and revise our concepts of
needs and progress and the nature of our relationship towards the natural environment.
I believe the key issue here is to acknowledge the effects that our actions have on
the environment, and this implies a moral consideration of the earth. I also believe that it
is important that we not to see ourselves as apart from the earth, but as part of it.
Philospher Stephen Toulmin writes: "Instead of viewing the world of nature as onlookers
from outside, we now have to understand how our own human life and activities operate
15
as elements within the world of nature. So we must develop a more coordinated view of
the world, embracing both the world of nature and the world of humanity."'
By realizing the effects of our actions and acknowledging our moral obligation to the
earth, we would want to choose a more sustainable future—not only for our own survival
but also for the earth itself.
I believe that a knowledge of ethics is essential for people to choose a sustainable
future. Ethics focuses on discovering the basic principles upon which we should base our
judgments about the moral rightness or wrongness of behavior. Our present political and
economic arrangements are retained only because they are perceived to be legitimate, and
their legitimacy ultimately rests on the perception that they are ethically justified.
Ethics can help clarify the values in a policy such as sustainable development.
Many public policy statements on environmental issues are laden with moral concepts,
for example "equity", "respect for nature", and "ecological integrity." All are important
for the message embedded in the policy. However, these terms are often used in a vague
and even contradictory fashion. Therefore, ethics is essential to clarify the values of these
concepts, and ethics may help to resolve some of the conflicts in value that often arise
between conservation and development projects. Furthermore, moral ideals have the
power to motivate people to care for the world around them. Ethics gives a voice to the
moral conscience in individuals, provides a language that expresses their moral intuitions,
and empowers them to share their feelings with others.
This thesis discusses the importance of an ethical understanding of sustainable
development. It is a search for an ethical framework for sustainable development.
16
1.2 Objective and Outline of the Thesis
This thesis focuses on the ethical dimensions of sustainable development. I will analyze
the ethical framework of sustainable development as defined by the Bruntland report and
discuss the following four questions:
a) What does sustainable development mean?
b) Do we have moral obligations to future generations to promote sustainable
development?
c) Can traditional moral philosophies, such as utilitarian and contractarian theory, justify
sustainable development?
d) What is the proper ethical framework for sustainable development?
In chapter two, I will discuss the history of sustainable development and different
approaches to or interpretations of sustainable development. The history of sustainable
development can be traced far back in the human history. However, I will focus on events
that have occurred during the last thirty years, which have contributed to the development
and promotion of sustainable development as a broad environmental policy.
Today there are many interpretations of sustainable development, that confuse our
language and thinking. It is therefore important to find a consensus on the meaning of
sustainable development. I have divided the interpretations of sustainable development
into three different approaches: weak, strong and ideal sustainable development. Weak
sustainable development approaches sustainable development mainly in terms of a free-
market economy. Strong sustainable development approaches sustainable development
17
through social equity. Finally, ideal sustainable development approaches sustainable
development from an environmental point of view.
In chapter three, I will question whether traditional moral philosophies can justify
sustainable development. The concept of sustainable development, as described in the
Bruntland report, holds that we do have certain moral obligations to future generations. I
will look into how utilitarian and contractarian theories deal with this obligation.
In the final chapter, I will present a holistic outlook on sustainable development—
a sustainable development that looks beyond today's anthropocentric framework. I
believe that sustainable development has the potential to be a "giant step" for the progress
of our civilization. While sustainable development is global in its vision, at the same time
it works at various civic and geographic levels and attempts to bring together many
different serious social and environmental problems. However, we need to connect the
concept of sustainable development to a holistic ethical framework in order to morally
justify the changes that are necessary to make the future more sustainable.
1.3 Terminology
In this thesis, many philosophical terms are used, and it is important that the reader
clearly understand how they are being used here.
In general conversation, ethics and morality are often used interchangeably.
However, morality refers to judgments and actions regarding what is right or good, and
ethics refers to the reasoning such judgments and actions require.' Therefore, the term
ethics is frequently considered to be equivalent to moral philosophy, which is the case in
18
this thesis. I use the term "moral obligation" to refer to a voluntary, mutually
acknowledged commitment to, or between, identifiable persons.'
Traditional ethical theory has hardly, or at least not specifically, dealt with the
relationship between humans and the natural world. Traditional ethical theories have
searched for reasons to justify and ground moral relationships between people and
societies. However, in the 1970s, a community of philosophers undertook the task of a
fundamental ethical reconstruction and formed a new discipline within applied ethics—
environmental ethics.'
Environmental ethics examines the moral basis of environmental responsibility.
The goal of environmental ethics is not to convince people that we should be concerned
about the environment. Instead, environmental ethics focuses on the moral foundation of
environmental responsibility and how far this responsibility extends. There are three
distinct theories of moral responsibility to the environment. Although each supports
environmental responsibility, their approaches are radically different.
The first of these theories is anthropocentric, or human-centered. Environmental
anthropocentrism is the view that all environmental responsibility is derived from human
interests alone." The assumption here is that only human beings are morally significant
and have a direct moral standing. Since the environment is crucial to human well-being
and survival, we have an indirect duty towards the environment. In other words, the
natural environment has an instrumental value to humans.
A second approach to environmental responsibility is an extension of the animal
rights view.' According to this view, environmental responsibility derives from the
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interest of all morally significant beings, which includes humans and at least some
animals. Like anthropocentrism, though, environmental obligation is still indirect.
The third approach to environmental responsibility, ecocentrism, maintains that
the environment deserves direct moral consideration and not one that is merely derived
from human (and/or animal) interests. 13 The environment has inherent worth and is
therefore by itself on a moral par with humans.
1 In Gifford Pinchot's resource conservation ethic, we see the origin of modern
sustainable development. The goal of the proper use of resources, according to the
resource conservation ethic, is for the greatest good of the greatest number of people for
the longest time. The resource conservation ethic is based on two principles. Its first
principle is that resources should be fairly distributed among present users and consumers
as well as future consumers. The second principle of the resource conservation ethic is
that resources should be used efficiently. Roderick Nash, Wilderness and American Mind
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); and Bryan G. Norton, Toward Unity Among
Environmentalist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
2
 Sverker Sörlin, Naturkontraktet: Om naturumgängets idéhistoria (Stockholm: Carlsson,
1991), p. 31.
3
 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
4
 Ibid., p. 8.
Gro Harlem Bruntland said at a 1988 United Nations conference in Toronto that "The
time has come to take a giant step in the progress of civilization." Nicholas M. Sosa, "The
Ethics of Dialogue and the Environment," in Earth Summit Ethics: Toward a
Reconstructive Postmodern Philosophy of Environmental Education, J. Baird Callicott
and Fernando J.R. da Rocha, eds. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p.
48-9.
6
 Ibid., p. 49.
7 Stephen Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the Theology of
Nature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 255-6.
8
 William K. Frankena, Ethics (Engelwood: Prentice Hall, 1973), p. 4.
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9 Ernest Partridge, Responsibilities to Future Generations (Buffalo: Prometheus Books,
1980), p. 5.
1° Publications on ethics and the environment are now commonplace in journals such as
Environmental Ethics and Environmental Values. The editor of Environmental Ethics,
Eugene C. Hargrove, has written a book about the roots of environmental ideals in the
Western tradition. Both the journals and Hargrove's book serve as a good introduction to
the literature and discussion of environmental ethics. Eugene C. Hargrove, Foundations
of Environmental Ethics (Denton: Environmental Ethics Books, 1989).
11 Environmentalism based on arguments of anthropocentric environmental ethics has
concerns about the welfare of the natural environment from a human point of view. This
welfare is often fueled by concern for future generations and/or economic self-interests
and/or spiritual values. Anthropocentrism is the predominant ethical framework used for
most public policy, including sustainable development and the Endangered Species Act.
Utilitarianism and contractarian theory, which will be discussed in chapter three, are
examples of philosophies that embrace an anthropocentric ethical framework.
12 The animal rights and animal liberation movements seek to extend moral concern to the
well-being of nonhumans. The two most influential philosophers in these animal
movements are Peter Singer and Tom Regan. Singer argues for a utilitarian philosophy
and wants to extend utilitarianism to include animals that can suffer or feel pain, "sentient
creatures." Regan argues that all creatures that can experience the "subject of life" have
an inherent value and should therefore have moral rights. However, according to Gary E.
Varner, there are restrictions to Regan's "subject of life," since only individuals that are
capable of having "desires" are given moral rights. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation,
(New York: A New York Review Book, distributed by Random House, 1975); Tom
Regan, "The Case for Animal Rights," in Peter Singer, ed., In Defense of Animals
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell Inc, 1985) p. 13-26; Gary E. Varner, "The Prospects for
Consensus and Convergence in Animal Rights Debate," in Donald VanDeVeer and
Christine Pierce, eds., The Environmental Ethics & Policy Book (Belmont: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1998), p. 123-9.
13
 Ecocentrism, sometimes called holism, has the view that natural systems, in and of
themselves, are valuable as systems which are greater than the individual parts.
Ecocentrism can be further divided into two groups. One group of philosophers views the
biosphere as an interconnected whole, which has a moral standing on its own, and, as
such, the biosphere can be viewed as an "organism." James E. Lovelock's "Gaia
Hypothesis" and Arne Naess's "Deep Ecology" are examples of this. The other group of
philosophers views the "ecosystemic community" as the source of environmental ethics.
In chapter four, I will discuss Aldo Leopold, one of the pioneers who introduced the
"community" as an ethical framework. For further reading and understanding of
ecocentrism see: James E. Lovelock, Gaia, a New Look at Life on Earth, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979); Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an
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Ecosophy," Trans. David Rothenberg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989);
Aldo Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac, and Sketches Here and There (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1949); and Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to
and Values in The Natural World (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1988).
CHAPTER 2
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: HISTORY AND INTERPRETATIONS
And how would you like your sustainability, Sir? Weak or strong?
Oh, strong please, but not absurdly strong.
And how about you Sir? Weak or strong?
Er, I'll take mine weak please, but not pathetically weak.
How many drops of sustainability would you like in it, one or two?
Ah, that all depends.
Depends on what Sir?
Oh, I'm afraid I haven't worked that out yet.
Wilfred Beckerman, Environmental Values, 1995.
In 1980 the concept of sustainable development first appeared in the World Conservation
Strategy of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.'
Ever since the term sustainable development was coined, there has been a lively
discussion both about definitions and about how to make sustainable development work
in practice. It is important to find as precise a definition as possible for sustainable
development so that a set of measurable criteria can be specified, which can be used to
create concrete development programs to implement sustainable development throughout
the world.
In this chapter I will view sustainable development as development that is
consistent with social and ecological realties, and I will discuss three different approaches
to sustainable development. However, first I will discuss the history of sustainable
22
23
development. I find it vital to discuss the meaning of sustainable development in a
historical context, because I see sustainable development as an evolutionary process.
You have to understand where you are coming from in order to understand where you are
and where you are heading—a cliché, but I believe this to be true in the case of
sustainable development.
2.1 History
The history of sustainable development can be traced back to the beginning of the 19 th
century, when our knowledge and understanding of our surrounding environment
accelerated rapidly. 2
 Table 1 lists some of the major scientific and social events that have
occurred during the last two hundred years, which have contributed to our understanding
of the concept of sustainable development. The list is far from complete, since it focuses
on major events in the western world, predominantly in the U.S. However, the list does
serve the purpose of exemplifying the wide understanding of environmental issues during
the last centuries.
I have chosen to discuss only some of the more recent events listed in table 1. In
particular, I will discuss several key international environmental conferences held during
the last 30 years, as well as how sustainable development emerged as an international
environmental policy.
The global concern for the environment started in the 1960s. At that time the
industrialized world saw extraordinary advances in science and technology, and the
expansion and globalization of information, communication and transportation. Before
the environmental movement became international it was national, and national
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environmental concern first appeared in countries such as the U.S., Canada, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Scandinavia.
In the U.S., the starting point of the modern environmental movement was
perhaps the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962. 3 Rachel Carson was a
marine biologist who had a deep understanding of nature's complex ecology and how
pesticides affect species and their ecosystems. Carson's ideas became the foundation of
the environmental movement and influenced environmental regulation not only in the
U.S. but all around the world.'
In particular, Carson influenced many non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
These environmental NGOs have played a crucial role in advocating for the environment,
increasing people's awareness of the causes of environmental problems, as well as
putting pressure on politicians and industry to adopt environmental policies that deal with
these problems.
One aspect of environmental problems that these NGOs have stressed is that many
environmental problems are global in nature, such as pollution and the depletion of the
ozone layer. At the end of the 1960s, many governments realized that they would benefit
from cooperation between nations on environmental issues. For international cooperation
to be effective, some formal commitment is necessary. In international affairs,
institutionalization is usually based on a treaty, or less formal written agreements or
programs of action.
The United Nations (UN) has played a major role in promoting such international
environmental programs and agreements since the 1960s. One of the first UN
environmental conferences was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in June 1972. In the same
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year, the Club of Rome presented some predicted scenarios concerning the environment,
pollution and population. Both the result of the Club of Rome's study as well as the
outcome of the Stockholm conference expressed the need for a global environmental
policy that would be able to deal with a wide range of social and environmental problems.
The broad policy that emerged was sustainable development. The UN-led World
Commission on Environment and Development presented a report in 1987, Our Common
Future, which was named the Bruntland report after the commission's chair Gro Harlem
Bruntland, former prime minister of Norway. This report is probably one of the most
significant documents in the field of sustainable development, since it defined sustainable
development, or more accurately described sustainable development. Sustainable
development was further acknowledged at the Earth Summit in Rio Janeiro, Brazil, in
June 1992, marking the twentieth anniversary of the Stockholm conference. By then the
concept of sustainable development was here to stay.
2.1.2 The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which was held in
Stockholm, Sweden, in June 1972, marked a turning point in international relations
concerning environmental issues. It legitimized environmental policy as a universal
concern among nations and placed environmental issues on their national agendas.
The conference was remarkable in that it gave respectful attention to developing
countries and NGOs. 5
 The environmental issues in developing countries (sometimes
referred to as the South) were far different from the environmental issues debated in
developed countries (referred to as the North). In the South, the main issues were poverty,
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hunger, disease and survival, whereas in the North the environmental discussion focused
on limiting growth, pollution, and on the protection of natural resources. 6
The formal outcome of the Stockholm conference was the Declaration on the
Human Environment, the Declaration of Principles, Recommendations for Action, and
the Resolution on Institutional and Financial Arrangements.' Another result of the
Stockholm conference was the establishment of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), a UN agency which would serve as a focal point for environmental
issues within the UN. 8
The legacy of the Stockholm conference was an enlarged and reinforced concept
of national environmental responsibility that has influenced international political, legal,
and organizational relationships ever since.' For example, the Stockholm conference
became a model for other international environmental conferences. These conferences
have played a major role in developing and launching international environmental policy.
The positive effects of these conferences include stimulating discussions and awareness
of global environmental issues and obtaining international agreements, such as the
Stockholm Declaration of Principles, the Rio Declaration, and the Convention on
Biodiversity. However, there are negative effects as well. These conferences have a
tendency to be rhetorical and compromise environmental issues to a point of inaction.
According to environmental policy analyst Lynton Caldwell the Stockholm
conference started a "new environmental paradigm," a large social transition which views
the earth as a domain of life, or biosphere, in which humans are temporary residents.'
The old view, which is still evident, saw the earth as a storehouse of resources to be used
freely and developed by humans. Paradigm shifts do not occur overnight, and I believe
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sustainable development should be viewed as a policy that tries to make the transition
from the old to the new view.
2.1.1 The Limits of Growth
In the postwar era, a number of neo-Malthusians, including Garrett Hardin and Paul
Ehrlich, raised alarm over increasing human populations and their economic activities,
and the potential harm that such growth could have on ecological systems and human
societies."
These concerns were discussed further by the Club of Rome, a loose association
of economists, scientists, educators, and industrialists from twenty-five countries. In
1972, the club presented a report entitled The Limits of Growth, which generated
enormous interest and controversy around the world.' The report presented computer-
generated projections of demographic, industrial, social, and ecological trends. Its
conclusion was that if the trends in human population, pollution, food production, and
resource depletion were to continue unchanged, then the limits of growth would be
reached within the next hundred years. However, the report also concluded that it was
possible to alter these trends if people were willing to change.
In light of these alarming trends, an awareness grew of a need for a broad
environmental policy, such as sustainable development, which would subsequently alter
these trends. The issues raised by the Club of Rome, such as population, pollution, food
production, and natural resources, became key issues in the Bruntland report.
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2.1.3 The Bruntland Report
The Bruntland report is most well-known for its classical description of sustainable
development. "Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable—to ensure that
it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.” 13
The Bruntland report suggested that the predicted catastrophe faced by the
environment that was presented by the Club of Rome could be altered through sustainable
development, within the framework of equity. According to the Bruntland report,
inequity and power are the planet's main environmental problems as well as the main
development problems—too much power in the North creates inequity towards the South.
There are two principles that underpin the Bruntland report." First, there is an
overriding priority of achieving basic human needs for all humankind. In effect, this
principle would uplift the living conditions of people in many developing countries.
Second, there are limits to development, which are mainly seen as technical, cultural and
social. This does not necessarily imply limits to economic growth. The vagueness of what
limits to development really means has opened up the possibility of many different
interpretations of the message of the Bruntland report, which I will discuss later in this
chapter.
The Bruntland report presented seven major proposals for a strategy for
sustainable development' s The strategy sought:
1) to revive growth;
2) to change the quality of that growth;
3) to meet basic needs for employment, food, energy, water and sanitation;
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4) to ensure a sustainable population base;
5) to conserve and enhance the natural resource base;
6) to refocus technology; and
7) to merge environmental issues into economic decision making by transforming
attitudes and practices.
The proposed sustainable development is a long-term strategy, extending to "future
generations," and the Bruntland report recommended ways of achieving this through
international cooperation and institutional reform. 16
The fact that the Bruntland report came directly out of the General Assembly of
the UN gave this report important political significance compared to other reports on
social and environmental issues. The UN General Assembly asked the creators of the
Bruntland report for a new report on the progress of sustainable development after five
years. This report was the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) which was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992, also
known as the Earth Summit.'
2.1.4 The Earth Summit
Sustainable development received attention from governments all over the world at the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992.
The Earth Summit was built upon the work that was done at the Stockholm
conference. However, the Earth Summit was a much lager conference than the Stockholm
conference of June 1972. At the Earth Summit 178 national governments were
represented in the deliberations, and 110 heads of states and 2,000 NGOs participated.'
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Furthermore, 8,000 journalists covered the conference closely, which helped spread
awareness of environmental issues, particularly of sustainable development to the public.
The principal official agreements achieved at the conference were the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, a statement on Forest Principles, and
Agenda 21. 19
 The Rio Declaration was a statement of twenty-seven principles regarding
the rights and responsibilities of nations towards the environment. The Forest Principles
were adopted separately since there was not sufficient agreement for a binding treaty on
forests. Agenda 21 was an action plan to guide the governments in developing
environmental policies for the twenty-first century. The conference was also the occasion
of the signing of two treaties that were significant for environmental policy—the
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biodiversity.20
The Rio conference also created the UN Commission on Sustainable
Development, which was established by the UN General Assembly in December 1992 to
monitor and report on progress by governments and international organizations towards
the goal of Agenda 21. 21
What became evident at the Earth Summit was that during the five years since the
Bruntland report, the sustainable development agenda had turned "green" and against
development. This was mainly due to the debate on sustainable development in the North,
driven by NGOs, such as the Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. 22 The "green"
approach of the North was widely disliked in the South, and the North-South conflict
increased, which created a deadlock in the sustainable development debate, and prevented
further agreements from being reached at the Earth Summit.
3 1
Since Rio, progress has been made, and the North-South conflict was somewhat
resolved at yet another conference, Earth Summit + 5, in New York, June 1997. This
conference reconfirmed the political commitment to sustainable development, an action-
oriented policy that attempts to deal with both social and environmental problems. 23 It
seems to me that there is a consensus today that we all have to change and move in a
more sustainable direction of economic growth and development. We have to face the
effects our actions have on the natural environment, and we have to change our behavior
for the future. Some argue that the path to sustainable development goes through a free-
market economy, or the adoption of new science and technology, whereas others believe
that we have to take a "giant step" which reaches deep into both our culture and our
behavior. In the next section, I will discuss some of these different paths or approaches to
sustainable development.
2.2 Approaches to the Concept of Sustainable Development
The broad concept of sustainable development has given rise to ambiguity and lack of
consistency in the use of the term. There is no general agreement on exactly what
sustainable development means. Even if one adopts the Bruntland definition or
description, which predominates, one immediately runs into questions of what "need"
means and how far into the future our obligation stretches, which I will discuss in the
next chapter.
However, this lack of clarification is not without its advantages. It has, for
example, allowed groups with different and often conflicting interests to reach some
common ground upon which concrete policies have been developed, such as the Rio
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Declaration.' However, some have argued that the ambiguity of the concept severely
diminishes its usefulness. For instance, many environmentalists claim that sustainable
development is so vague that it allows almost anything to be sustainable.' "Sustainable
development is in real danger of becoming a cliché like appropriate technology—a
fashionable phrase that everyone pays homage to but nobody cared to define." 26
Furthermore, many environmentalists seem to dislike the term sustainable development,
since they believe it is a "license to economic growth."'
A major part of the discussion about the concept of sustainable development has
focused on the contradiction between the two terms of sustainability and development.
Sustainability or sustainable has its origin in the context of the harvesting and managing
of renewable resources, such as forests, in such a way as not to damage future supplies.'
This emphasizes the constraints and opportunities that nature presents to human activity.
The task is to establish forms of management that do not lead to widespread irreversible
damage to the natural environment. Development, on the other hand, implies a change
often growth of some kind, whether material, qualitative, economic, exponential, or
intellectual.' In the socio-political context, development most frequently implies
economic growth. The contradiction lies in that sustainability implies preservation of a
relative status quo or steady state condition, such as in the case of forest management to
ensure a steady state of forest supplies. Development, on the other hand, is driven by
some kind of change, such as quantitative growth.
It is unfortunate that the concept of sustainable development is based on terms
that seem to symbolize such contradiction. However, taken together each term modifies
the other to give the concept of sustainable development its particular meaning. Thus, the
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meaning of sustainable development is a development that is consistent with social and
ecological realties. This is vague and, according to Caldwell, the precise meaning of
sustainable development depends on the practical situation where it is applied.
"Only when applied to specific processes or conditions do these words [sustainable and
development] have implementable content."'
It is important to find as precise a definition as possible for sustainable
development, so that a set of measurable criteria can be specified which can be used to
create concrete development programs to implement sustainable development throughout
the world. However, in this thesis the problems of the precise definitions of sustainable
development are not the focus. I am primarily concerned with the fundamental messages
behind the concept and its ethical framework. I will therefore not further discuss the
precise definition of sustainable development as applied in different practical situations.
Instead, I will view sustainable development as development that is consistent with social
and ecological realties.
This is a concept of sustainable development that can be viewed as the center of
the three spheres of the economy, society, and the environment (see figure 1).
Figure 1. Sustainable development is achieved through a balance between the three
spheres of the economy, society, and the environment.
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In order to move in a more sustainable direction, we have to find a balance
between the economy, society (including global equity, ethnicity, cultures and religions),
and the environment. There are many overlapping approaches to sustainable
development, which I have divided into three main groups, referring to which one of the
three spheres of sustainable development that play the dominant one, i.e. the economy,
society or the environment.
The first group approaches sustainable development mainly in terms of a free-
market economy. This approach has been called weak sustainable development, since it
lacks strong commitment to the social and environmental spheres of sustainable
development.' The second group approaches sustainable development from a social
consciousness. This group has been called strong sustainable development, referring to its
commitment to the social sphere of sustainable development." The third group
approaches sustainable development from an environmental point of view and is called
ideal sustainable development.' Table 3 (at the end of this chapter) summarizes these
different approaches to sustainable development.
2.2.1 Weak Sustainable Development
Weak sustainable development is rooted in neoclassical economics and, as such, tries to
integrate economic growth with environmental concerns. This approach is closely
associated with the work of environmental economist David Pearce. 34 The objective is to
promote sustainable development through economic growth and the global free-market in
order to maintain the level of human well-being.
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Economic markets focus upon profit and tend to allocate and reward investments
with short-term paybacks. Some desirable policy outcomes, such as protection of the
environment and conservation of natural resources, have traditionally not been achieved
through reliance upon markets. However, in the weak approach to sustainable
development, long-term goals and environmental considerations are described as
environmental costs and externalities. These costs and externalities are then internalized
in the free-market so that it becomes more efficient. An important feature of this approach
is the term maintaining well-being, which does not necessary imply maintaining a level
of consumption, or maintaining an intact overall stock of natural resources, but instead
implies maintaining the well-being of humans through allowing substitutability of
different natural resources (natural capital) and man-made capital.'
This weak sustainable development approach favors the Northern view of
economic growth since efficient free-markets only exist in the North. Furthermore, this
approach only recommends minor attempts to redistribute investments to developing
countries in order to encourage economic growth and local economic self-sufficiency in
the South.' In addition, the weak approach to sustainable development does not extend
equity to include future generations. The benefits are primarily for the present generation,
but if inter-generational justice is considered then it is in the form of discounting rates.'
Weak sustainable development has had an increasing influence on international
agencies such as the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). This is not surprising since these lending agencies explicitly
depend on further economic expansion to recoup their loans.'
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Policy tools for implementing sustainable development include various economic
tools. For example cost-benefit analysis and marginal adjustment forces the market to
take into account market failure through, for instance, taxes and tradable permits.
Weak sustainable development is closely associated with an anthropocentric and
technocentric view of nature, where the environment is seen as a resource in the service
of humans. The environment are limited to monetary values, and do not include, for
instance, cultural and spiritual values. Weak sustainable development also reduces
environmental problems to managerial problems, that are solvable through new
technologies within the context of the dominant political and economic system.
2.2.2 Strong Sustainable Development
Strong sustainable development approaches sustainable development from a social
consciousness point of view and acknowledges some of the limits of the weak sustainable
approach, such as the inequity between the North and the South. The strong sustainable
development approach further recognizes the need for deeper modifications of the market
economy in order to create sustainable societies. This approach argues that there is a need
for a different kind of economic development, that is focused on social and environmental
issues. However, even if there were to be less of an emphasis on quantitative economic
growth and instead more focus on qualitative development, the overall objective of
development as growth remains. 39
The strong sustainable development approach has the greatest connection to, or
similarity with, the Bruntland report, since equity is given an overriding priority. The
major objective with strong sustainable development is to minimize the difference
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between North and South by uplifting the living conditions in developing countries and
satisfying basic human needs. Furthermore, equity is also extended to include future
generations—our actions should not compromise the ability of future generations to meet
their needs.
Strong sustainable development emphasizes the use of policy instruments such as
legal, economic and fiscal tools in order to influence or force changes in human behavior.
These instruments could, for instance, include legal regulations and land-use planning,
green taxes pollution charges and tradable pollution permits, subsidies, information, etc.
The ethical framework for the strong sustainable development approach is
predominantly anthropocentric, since it is the well-being of humans that is the primary
moral obligation. However, the well-being of other living beings is also considered—
"there are also moral, ethical, cultural, aesthetic, and purely scientific reasons for
conserving wild beings."40
2.2.3 Ideal Sustainable Development
The ideal sustainable development approach is associated with the environmental
movement, particularly the deep ecology movement.' This approach envisages a form of
pure or ideal sustainable development in which humans put as much back into the
ecosystems as they take out. The ideal approach aims to offer a profound structural
change in society, the economy and political systems, with the premise of a radical
change in the attitude of humans towards nature and our environment.
According to this approach, there is no overall growth in traditionally quantitative
terms.' Instead growth is purely qualitative—through the quality of life rather than
38
standard of living. However, this could imply quantitative growth in some areas, such as
in developing countries.
The precondition in this approach is an ecocentric position, which values the
different forms of life and recognizes the inter-relatedness of all life. The environment
therefore has its own value, regardless of its usefulness to humans. The ideal approach
stresses the ecological perspectives of sustainable development.
This approach has been embraced by many environmental NGOs, which was
evident at the Earth Summit, when much of the sustainable development debate had
turned "green" and antidevelopmental.
2.3 Towards an Ethically Meaningful Concept of Sustainable Development
The three approaches presented, weak, strong and ideal sustainable development, could
symbolize the transition from the old to the new environmental paradigm, as discussed by
Caldwell. The old view, which is evident in the weak approach, sees the earth as a
storehouse of resources to be used freely and developed by humans; strong sustainable
development falls somewhere between the old and new views; and ideal sustainable
development fully embraces the new environmental paradigm. This new environmental
paradigm advocates a large social transition and views the earth as a domain of life, or
biosphere, in which humans are temporary residents.
Given these three different basic approaches to sustainable development, the issue
becomes one of finding an ethical framework for the concept of sustainable development.
Our future, as well as the future of the usefulness of the concept of sustainable
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development, lies in whether we can find a realistic and ethically justifiable policy that
addresses the serious issues imbedded in the concept of sustainable development.
In the next chapter I will discuss the ethical framework of the Bruntland report. I
have chosen to focus on the strong approach to sustainable development since it
predominates in policy discussions and has been the common ground for many different
interests groups—more of a middle ground position. However, the Bruntland report's
definition of sustainable development is based on two assumptions, namely, that we have
obligations to future generations and that we can predict their needs and preferences.
These assumptions are ethically analyzed in the next chapter. I will discuss whether or
not traditional moral philosophies such as utilitarian and contractarian theories can justify
these assumptions and ultimately justify sustainable development according to the
Bruntland definition.
Table 1. A Chronology list of main scientific and social events leading to the concept of
sustainable development. 43
EVENT SIGNIFICANCE
1800 Lamarck expressed need to know a species
from its connections to the whole
First identification of animal-plant-
environmental interaction
1825 De La Malle identifies plant succession
process
Recognition of intermediate species domination
1843 Stephen Forbes discuss effects of
succession on animal habitat
Connects plant succession to changes in animal
species make up
1859 Origin of Species, Darwin Competition as a natural selection process
1863 Kerner von Marilaun, University of Vienna,
studied plant associations in land around the
Danube River
Concept formulated that plant species interact
and are interdependent
1877 Karl Mobius, University of Kiel, coined
"biocoenos," a community of living things
First expression of the collection of plants and
animal as a interactive system
1878 Yellowstone Park created (USA) First protection of environment by a government
act—aesthetic ethic
1887 The Lake as a Microcosm, Stephen Forbes Expansion of plant-animal community concept
1892 Sierra Club (NGO) First NGO formed for nature (wilderness)
conservation
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Table 1. Continued.
1905 National Audubon Society (NGO) Interest and protection of birds
1908 Women's National Rivers & Harbours
Congress
Women became a political force in nature
conservation
1909 National Conservation Congress (1909-
1912) USA
Adam & Shelford apply ecological concepts
to animal sciences
1913 Ecological Society of GB (NGO) First nature conservation agency
1916 National Parks Act
Biological Society of USA (NGO)
1919 National Parks and Conservation
Association (NGO)
1935 Wilderness Society (NGO)
1936 National Wildlife Federation (NGO)
1949 A Sand Country Almanac, Aldo Leopold Ecological perspective on land management—
land ethic
1951 Nature Conservancy (NGO)
1952 London Smog claims 4,000 lives First major human health disaster from pollution
1955 Clean Air Act (USA) First national pollution law enacted
1960 Clean Water Act (USA)
1961 World Wildlife Fund (NGO)
1962 Silent Spring, Rachel Carson First alert of widespread pesticide pollution in
environment
1963 Clean Air Act amended (USA)
1964 Wilderness Act (USA)
1965 Water Quality Act
Solid Waste Disposal Act (USA)
Clean Air Act amended (USA)
1966 National Wildlife Refuge Systems Recognition of species extinction by humans
1967 Environmental Defense Fund (NGO)
Torrey Canyon oil spill (GB)
Clean Air Act amended (USA)
Legal strategies focus of environmental
protection
First environmental catastrophe
1968 Zero Population Growth (NGO)
Paris Biosphere Conference (UNESCO)
The Population Bomb, Ehrlich
First Club of Rome meeting
Wild and Scenic River Act (USA)
National Trails Act (USA)
Recognition of population problem
Convened to study combination of sociology,
economics, demography, ecology and biology as
relates to environmental problems
1969 Friends of the Earth (NGO)
Union of Concerned Scientists (NGO)
National Environmental Policy Act Forms basis for formation of US Environmental
Protection Agency—first such national agency
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Table 1. Continued.
1970 National Resources Defense Council
(NGO)
Earth Day, April 22
Environmental Protection Agency
established
Clean Air Act amended (USA)
Water Quality Control Act (USA)
World-wide public recognition of global
environmental protection
1971 Greenpeace (NGO)
France forms a federal environmental
agency
West Germany adopts federal
environmental program
First environmental agency in Europe
1972 UN Stockholm Conference on Human
Environment, Stockholm, Sweden
First returnable bottle law, Oregon, USA
Club of Rome issues the report Limits to
Growth
Water Pollution Control Act (USA)
Marine Mammal Protection Act (USA)
Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act
(USA)
Coastal Zone Management Act
United Nations Environmental Programme
created—first international recognition of
environmental issues
Connects population growth with economic,
social, and environmental activities and predicts
environmental and social collapse unless growth
and environmental damage cease
1973 European Environmental Action Program
created
Endangered Species Act (USA)
1974 CFC danger reported
World population at 4 billion
Safe Drinking Water Act (USA)
Identification of global environmental threat
from UVb increases due to stratospheric ozone
layer depletion
1975 Worldwatch Institute formed (NGO) Begins observation of global social, economic
and environmental conditions
1976 National Academy of Sciences opposed
aerosol sprays (USA)
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(USA)
Fishery Conservation Act (USA)
Hazardous material controlled
1977 North Sea oil spill (8.2 m. gallons)
Clean Air Act amended (USA)
Clean Water Act amended (USA)
Ocean Dumping Act amended (USA)
1978 Three Mile Island radioactive leak (USA)
Amoco Cadiz oil spill off France (70 m.
gallons)
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Table 1. Continued.
1979 Greanpeace (NGO)
World population at 5 billion
Oil tanker collision, Trinidad and Tobango
(97 m. gallons)
1980 Earth First! (NGO)
Global 2000 Report to President Carter
(USA)
Superfund (Comprehensive Environment
Response Act (USA)
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act (USA)
1982 Earth Island Institute (NGO)
Rocky Mountain Institute (NGO)
UN World Charter for Nature
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (USA)
1983 Die Grünen elected to parliament, West
Germany
Green party becomes first politically
empowered environmental group
1984 North American Bioregional Congress I
Bhopal plant disaster, India
Bruntland Commission appointed
Famine in the Sahel, Africa
First Worldwatch Institute State of the
World report
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
amended (USA)
Comprehensive global social, economic and
environmental indicators
1985 Rain Forest Action Network (NGO)
Antarctic ozone hole discovered
1986 Nuclear plant explosion, Chernobyl,
Ukraine
Safe Drinking Water Act amended
1987 The Bruntland report Our Common Future
Montreal CFC Protocol
Clean Water Act amended (USA)
Synthesizes the concept of sustainable
development
First global treaty for environmental protection
of the Stratospheric Ozone layer
1990 Clean Air Act amended (USA) First Act to use the economic incentive of
tradable permits on SOx emissions
1992 The Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Table 2. A summary of the key issues in the three different approaches to sustainable development.'
Approach to
Sustainable
Development
Role of
Economy
Role of
Equity
Role of
Nature
Geographical
Focus
Civil Society Policies and
Sectoral
Integration
Institution Policy
Instruments
and Tools
Ethics
Ideal Model Environment-
ally regulated
market; major
changes in
levels of
production
and
consumption
Inter- and
intra-
generational
equity
Strong
commitment
to nature;
promoting
and protecting
biodiversity
Bioregional-
ism; extensive
local self-
sufficiency
Bottom-up
community
structures and
control.
Holistic
intersectoral
integration
Decentral-
ization of
political,
legal, social
and economic
institutions
Full range of
policy tools;
sophisticated
use of
indicators
Anthropocentric
Eco-centric
Strong
Sustainable
Development
Environment-
ally regulated
market; some
changes in
patterns of
production
and
consumption
Equity a
major issue;
strengthened
redistribution
policy
Commitment
to nature;
environmental
management
and protection
Heightened
local
economic self
sufficiency,
promoted in
the context of
global
markets
Open-ended
dialogue and
envisioning
Environment-
al policy
integration
across sectors
Some
restructuring
of institutions
Advanced use
of
sustainability
indicators;
wide range of
policy tools
Weak
Sustainable
Development
Market-reliant
environmental
policy; small
changes in
patterns of
consumption,
exponential
growth
Equity a
marginal
issue
Replacing
finite
resources
with capital;
exploitation
Global
markets and
global
economy with
some initial
moves to
local
economic
self-
sufficiency
Top-down
initiatives;
limited state-
environmental
movements
dialogue
Sector-driven
approach
Minimal
amendments
to institutions
Token use of
environmental
indicators;
limited range
of market-led
policy tools
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CHAPTER 3
DO WE OWE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TO FUTURE GENERATIONS
The nation behaves well if it treats the natural resources as assets which it must turn over
to the next generation increased; and not impaired in value.
Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, 1910
The concept of sustainable development, as described in the Bruntland report,
acknowledges that we do have certain moral obligations to future generations.' Our
actions today should ensure not only our ability to meet our own needs but also that we
do not compromise the ability of future generations to meet theirs. At first glance, this
obligation might seem quite straightforward: we ought to save something for the future.
This kind of posterity argument appeals to many people because of their desire to pass on
something that matters to them.
Several prominent politicians, policy analysts, and environmentalists use these
kinds of emotional arguments since they speak directly to the heart of an individual. Al
Gore, vice-president of the United States, writes that he wants his children and their
children, and so on, to be able to drink clean water and experience the richness and
diversity of nature.' John Passmore, another advocate of our moral obligation to future
generations, regards the grounds for our obligation to future generations as a "chain of
love." Passmore argues, "there is, then, no novelty in a concern for posterity, when
posterity is thought of not abstractly—as 'the future of mankind'—but as a world
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inhabited by individuals we love or feel a special interest in." 3 These kinds of emotional
arguments are passionate, but are they truly a demonstration of our moral obligations to
future generations? I believe that most parents would be willing to change or even
sacrifice some of their own needs in order to satisfy the needs of their children. However,
caring for your children and grandchildren is not the same as expressing moral
obligations to future generations.
From a biological point of view, caring for and nurturing one's offspring has been
a successful trait in human evolution. Unfortunately, one might say, we have been too
successful. The enormous increase in human population and our unrelenting demand for
economic growth has led to the ecological crisis that we are facing today. Sustainable
development attempts to establish a new path of development—a more equitable and
ecological development, both in the present and for future generations. Sustainable
development raises the moral question of relations between generations. Caring for future
generations, and the nature of our moral obligations to them, demand careful analysis.
Our obligations to future generations cannot be based solely on sentiment. Sentiment and
posterity arguments can serve as catalysts for environmental policies and environmental
action. Nevertheless, emotional arguments alone are not a sufficient motivation for acting
and expressing moral obligations to future generations.'
There seems to be no question about our moral obligation to people of the next
few generations. We ought to have the same theory of justice for them as we have for
people of our own generation and of other generations now living. Why? The next few
generations will have roughly the same needs and preferences we have today. We also
have a fairly good idea of their identities, since they are our offspring and products of our
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societies, religions, cultures, etc. The problem arises when obligations to remote future
generations are discussed. Remote future generations are generally understood to mean
more than ten generations, or 250 years or more from the present.'
One might think that since it is a problem to justify moral obligations to remote
future generations, they should not be considered in determining policies. However,
sustainable development affects future generations both in the near and remote future in
basically two ways. Firstly, it affects peoples' lives—their standard of living or quality of
life. Secondly, sustainable development will determine the identity of people—the very
existence of future people. Because future generations, both near and remote, would be
affected by sustainable development, we cannot, in my opinion, exclude remote future
generations when discussing the moral obligation to future generations.
In this chapter, I will discuss how the traditional moral philosophies of utilitarian
and contractarian theory deal with moral obligations to future generations. I have chosen
to discuss these two philosophies since they are often used as an ethical framework in
making public policy. At the end of this chapter, I will also discuss philosopher Avner
De-Shalit's theory of transgenerational community, which I see as an extension of
contractarian theory mixed with traditional posterity arguments. I will give a short
introduction to both utilitarian and contractarian theory, in which I will summarize some
of their key elements. However, my main focus throughout the chapter is to explore how
utilitarian and contractarian theory justify the moral obligation to future generations. I
will challenge these traditional moral philosophies and discuss whether they can truly
provide us with arguments that show that we have a moral obligation to future
generations.
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3.1 Utilitarianism
In its classical form, utilitarianism maintains that we ought to act so as to promote the
greatest good for the greatest number of people.' This principle of the maximization of
happiness can be stretched over generations, since utilitarianism is a universal theory of
ethics that considers each person's interests to the same degree. "Each to count for one,
no one to count for more than one."' The utilitarian framework does not take into account
ethnicity, gender, nationality, nor the time in which one lives. "Happiness, or utility, is as
intrinsically good this year as it will be ten, twenty or five hundred years from now."'
This means that the principle of maximization of happiness can be extended to include
future generations. The best policy of action is the one that promotes the greatest
transgenerational happiness and causes the least transgenerational pain.
Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism: it is the consequences, or results, of
an act or policy that are in focus. A policy such as sustainable development, which affects
future generations, should be judged according to its consequences or expected outcomes
in the future as well as how it affects people living today. Utilitarianism assumes that
these results can be meaningfully quantified and measured. These kinds of calculations
can be done with a cost-benefit analysis, in which the quantification normally is based on
economic valuation.
Cost-benefit analysis is a tool used in policy making. In a cost-benefit analysis,
the total benefits and costs involved in a policy or project are calculated. The costs are
subtracted from the benefits, and if the benefits are greater than the costs, then the cost-
benefit analysis is in favor of the policy or project. These kinds of calculations are
controversial, especially when they involve the natural environment and costs and
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benefits that extend far into the future.' Some of the reasons why cost-benefit analysis is
so controversial have to do with the fact that it shares some common problems with
utilitarian theory in general, such as identifying and calculating future peoples' needs and
preferences, as well as their identity. These essential issues will be discussed in this
chapter. In addition, I will present two different schools of thought—average
utilitarianism and total utilitarianism—and discuss how they might influence population
policy.
3.1.1 Average and Total Utilitarianism
Sustainable development is closely linked to population policy, since the enormous
increase in human population that we see today is based in part on the unsustainable use
of the earth's resources. Many environmental problems, such as resource depletion,
pollution, and climate change, can be viewed as direct consequences of people's behavior
and their numbers. This effect has been referred to as the "tragedy of the commons."'
Ecological misbehavior over the last few decades has caused obvious environmental
problems. However, the over-stressing of the environment due to the sheer numbers of
people, while perhaps not as obvious, might in fact be as severe. When the capacity of the
environment is exceeded by human demands for space, food, energy, and waste disposal,
the problems that are created are simultaneously human and environmental. This is why a
broad policy such as sustainable development is needed, for it is a policy that deals with
economic, social, and environmental issues. Thus, one can see population policy as part
of sustainable development. And since they both raise questions about moral obligations
to future generations, I am going to use population policy as an example of how
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utilitarianism deals with obligations to future generations in general.
How does the utilitarian principle of maximization of happiness apply to
population policy? If I know that my children will be happy, do I have an obligation to
bring them into this world to increase the transgenerational happiness? On the other hand,
if my future children are going to be less happy, does this mean that I should not conceive
them? Is it acceptable to produce more and more children as long as they are happy?
Before I can answer these questions, I will consider the distinction between the notions of
total and average happiness and show how these two different utilitarian concepts tackle
some of the above questions.
With a fixed population there is not much difference between total and average
utilitarianism. However, the two utilitarian schools of thought, total and average
happiness, both run into problems since they deal with generations of people to come and
not a fixed population."
Average utilitarianism, which endorses the principle of average happiness, has to
confront problems like the following hypothetical situation: I live in a "happy"
community on the Upper West Side of New York City. Suppose that I decided to have a
child and the child turns out to be less happy than the average individual in my
community. An average utilitarian would have recommended that I not have the child in
the first place, because a less happy child would lower the average happiness of the
community. However, using average utilitarianism as a principle in determining
population policy might not only have the outcome of guiding people to stop conceiving
children, since there are other ways to maximize the average utility. For example, average
utility could increase by getting rid of all unhappy people, provided that this does not
54
affect the happiness of the happy ones. Therefore, to average utilitarians genocide would
be acceptable as a draconian measure since it would be justifiable in that it would
increase the average happiness. The average utilitarian guidelines for population policy
would therefore be either to stop conceiving children, so that we who already exist can
continue to live in a happy way and hopefully even develop in a sustainable way, or to get
rid of unhappy people. Both of these guidelines could have extremely inhumane results,
especially in developing countries where children are sometimes the only investment in
the future and the only hope for many people for a secure old age.
Let us now turn to total utilitarianism and see what kind of influence its position
could have on population policy. The goal of total utilitarianism is to maximize the
number of happy people. This utilitarian perspective is also problematic. A total
utilitarian would recommend that I have the child, even though he or she might be less
happy than the average, since the child's happiness, as well as the happiness he or she
would bring to me and my partner, all add up to a greater total happiness. Thus, according
to total utilitarianism, we are obliged to produce as many children as possible as long as
their existence adds to the total sum of human happiness. 12
Although the guidelines advocated by total utilitarianism would be the opposite of
that of average utilitarianism, they are equally absurd. In my opinion, the earth is already
overpopulated today. Using total utilitarianism as the basis for making population policy
would cause the human population to expand even further, resulting in more
unsustainable development.
Jan Narveson, a philosopher who is in support of total utilitarianism,
acknowledges some of the shortfalls of this view, claiming that we do not have any
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obligation to reproduce unless bringing forth a child would prevent suffering.' According
to Narveson, there is no moral obligation to produce a child, even if we could be sure that
he or she would be happy, but there is a moral obligation not to produce a miserable
child.
This argument leads us to the conclusion that it is preferable not to produce a
child, because, even if the child is happy, no obligation has been fulfilled, but if he or she
is miserable, a duty has been violated. At least Narveson's argument does not propose the
cruel measures discussed above.
However, Narveson's position is "person-regarding," meaning that obligations
always have to be directed towards someone." Since future generations do not yet exist,
this kind of morality makes it difficult to have obligations to those future generations.
However, one could argue that there is an obligation to future people if one is certain that
they will exist. There is therefore a distinction between future people and possible future
people: 5 Future people are those whose existence is independent of our actions or
policies today. For example, I might intend to have children in the future whether or not
sustainable development is implemented. On the other hand, possible future people are
those whose existence depends on a given action. For example, my future grandchildren's
children might not exist if we do not now adopt sustainable development. Narveson
argues that his person-regarding morality implies moral obligations only to contemporary
and future people. In the next section I will discuss an objection to this argument.
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3.1.2 The Identity Problem
The "Identity Problem" was originally put forward by philosopher Derek Parfit to argue
against adopting a person-regarding morality in the context of energy policy.' Parfit's
argument goes along these lines:
1. If I had been born in a different month, or another time, then I would have been a
different person.
2. Our actions now, and the policies that we endorse, affect people's behavior and
destinies, which also implies the identity of future persons. For example, had my
father not met my mother, then I would not exist.
3. Suppose that we had to choose between two policies. One is to deplete a high
percentage of the available resources—live in a very unsustainable way—and the
other is to conserve resources—live in a sustainable way. The result of the
unsustainable policy would be a higher standard of living for the present generation.
A result of this could be that many children would be conceived. These children
would all be different from those who would have been born if the sustainable policy
had been chosen. The result of the latter policy could be a higher standard of living
for future people relative to those who would have been born as a result of the
unsustainable policy.
Parfit's argument leads to the following paradox. If we have an unsustainable
policy, then we do not harm anybody, because if we had chosen a sustainable policy then
different people would exist. According to a utilitarian analysis, this paradox reveals that
we really have no duty to future generations because of the fact that it is a certain set of
people that would be created, and not others, when adopting a policy. This further implies
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that it is this set of people, and not others, that would benefit and, as such, would have no
right to complain about distribution, welfare, and so forth.
A utilitarian objection to Parfit's argument would be that we should look at the
amount of happiness that each policy will bring to present and future people, whoever
they are, and decide accordingly which is the preferable policy." This would work as
long as the population number is fixed. However, the different policies affect not only
who is going to exist but also the number of people that will be born. Because the
utilitarian person-regarding morality is so problematic, it is my conclusion that we should
choose a non-person-regarding morality instead.
3.1.3 Intergenerational Distribution of Resources
Dealing with population policy and sustainable development also brings up questions of
intergenerational distribution. For example, we do not know for sure how long we
humans are going to exist, but we believe that if we adopt a more sustainable lifestyle,
then the earth's resources will last much longer, and humanity stands a better chance of
surviving. This change in lifestyle, adopting a more sustainable lifestyle, may cause us
great discomfort now and for a couple of generations to come. However, the unhappiness
now might be outweighed by the gains in the far distant future, which could be
substantial. However, questions about intergenerational justices and how to distribute
resources between generations are complex. Utilitarian philosophy is not clear on these
issues. According to de-Shalit, "the principle of maximizing utility over generations says
nothing about what the distribution of resources should be, beyond the fact that the
distribution is dictated by the overall goal." 18 Utilitarianism can therefore either ask too
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much of us contemporaries, or ask too little of us, which is the case if we do not have any
moral obligation to future generations.'
3.1.4 Future Peoples' Needs
If people in the future could speak to us in order to influence our perceptions and actions,
what would they say? What would they need? A clear understanding of the needs of
future generations might lead us to overlook some of the practical problems involved in
calculating the outcome of a policy such as sustainable development. However, how
would we be able to find out the needs and preferences of future people?
In order to gain as accurate a sense as possible of the needs of future generations,
philosopher Allen Tough led a survey based on role-playing.' The role-play participants
were students from nine different countries, ranging from high school to postgraduate in
the fields of future studies, business, philosophy, and communication. The study was
conducted at 13 locations all around the world.
The students were instructed to play the roles of people who would be alive
several decades from now. They were asked to describe what their needs would be as
well as what kind of messages and recommendations they would send back to the people
and governments of today. Combining the results of the role-play with a literature search
about people's needs in the future, Tough was able to construct a hypothetical scenario
regarding the needs of future people. These needs were divided into seven categories:
Peace and Security, Environment, Catastrophes, Governance, Knowledge, Children, and
Learning.
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In my opinion Tough's study as well as many other prediction models are absurd.
To make predictions about what might happen in the future, especially the very distant
future, involves too many uncertainties, making it almost impossible to measure the
outcome of a policy.
Nevertheless, the satisfaction of human needs, both in the present and in the
future, is a major objective of sustainable development. The Bruntland report defines
essential human needs as the minimum standards of needs for job, food, energy, water
and sanitation. 21
These basic needs might be what many people in developing countries are hoping
to fulfill today. At the same time, many people, especially in developed countries, are
trying to satisfy more materialistic needs. In satisfying people's needs, whether they are
living today or in the future, one always has to consider that needs and preferences are
highly subjective. I do believe that there are some basic essential needs, such as nutrition,
clean water, and shelter, etc. However, once these basic needs have been satisfied, other
needs emerge, and these needs are determined by an individual's taste, which is
subjective and can be easily manipulated. For instance, people in the future might prefer
plastic trees to real ones, since future tastes will to a significant degree be determined by
what is advertised, or what people are taught to like, and ultimately by what is available.'
Environmental philosopher Eric Katz argues, and I agree, that there are
weaknesses in using utilitarian arguments, such as satisfying human needs and
preferences, to motivate environmental action.' Katz's position is that if utilitarian views
were the goal of environmental policy, then saving rare species and preserving natural
environments might not lead to the maximization of human satisfaction. Humans might
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in fact be happier in an artificial world, and Katz draws this conclusion. "Only when the
preservation of natural objects is seen to be an intrinsically good policy of action, rather
than a means to some kind of satisfaction, will a policy of environmental protection be
explained and justified."24
The difficulties we experience in applying utilitarianism to sustainable
development derive from the fact that the very existence of future people and thus also
their needs and preferences depend upon policies which are in affect today. How are we
to decide on a policy by calculating utilities when, at the same time, this decision effects
future peoples' needs, preferences, identities, or even existence?
3.2 Contractarian Theory
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory and as such bases morality solely on the
consequences of actions. Utilitarianism strives to maximize happiness, which, according
to philosopher Immanuel Kant, is a morality based on a "hypothetical imperative." Such a
morality is based on terms, or commands, that express subjective preferences. 25
On the other hand, there are systems of ethics that base morality on Kant's
"categorical imperative," which proposes that there are unconditional ethical duties that
apply in all possible circumstances, regardless of our goals or the result of our actions. 26
An ethics that is based on Kant's categorical imperative is referred to as non-
consequentalistic ethics or deontological ethics. This ethics commands actions that are
independent of a desired end, such as happiness.
Contractarian theory has its origin in natural-law theory and is based on a non-
consequentalistic ethic. The notion of a social contract in which morality is founded
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solely on uniform social agreements that serve the best interests of those who make the
agreements was first introduced by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. 27
 A contemporary version of social-contract theory has been presented by
philosopher John Rawls, and is most clearly set forth in his book, A Theory of Justice. 28
For Rawls, justice is "the way in which social institutions distribute fundamental
rights and duties, and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation."'
The central concept of Rawls's theory is his "original position," which is based on the
assumption that a "free and rational person concerned to further their own interests would
accept an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their
association."' In simple terms, we would all voluntarily agree to a contract that sets forth
how to distribute all economic and social benefits fairly and objectively.
Why would people agree to such a contract? According to Rawls, people would
agree to the contract if they did not know the specifics of their own status—if they were
behind a "veil of ignorance."' This veil of ignorance is like imagining that you exist
outside the world and that you are suddenly thrust into it, not knowing your specific
status. You might be born in the U.S. or Bangladesh, rich or poor, athletic or suffering
from birth defects, facing the world today or some hundred years from now. If we could
think beyond our physical and social circumstances, then we would be able to see
ourselves as if from behind a veil of ignorance, and then we would agree to a contract that
would be fair and objective.
Rawls does not believe that people would act out of general ignorance, only
ignorance of their own position. He assumes that the person in the original position would
have all the available knowledge concerning economic theory, political affairs, human
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behavior, the basis of social organizations, and so on—all that would be required by a
person to make an informed decision in determining principles of justice.
From the perspective of Rawl's original position, it would seem that we have
moral obligations to future generations, even though Rawls does not explicitly address
this. However, acting under a veil of ignorance where we do not know our own specific
status could include not knowing when one lives, which could imply a moral obligation
to future generations. In order to have such obligations, we have to accept the underlying
assumptions on which the original position is based. We have to assume that it is possible
to enter into a contract with not-yet-born people and that we can keep an ongoing contract
over many generations. We also have to believe that there is some kind of equality of
power between generations. Further, we have to assume that it is possible to enter into a
contract without thinking about our physical and social circumstances.
If we can accept these assumptions, then we have found an ethical theory that can
justify moral obligations to future generations and serve as an ethical framework for
sustainable development. My objective here is to discuss some of these underlying
assumptions in Rawls' original position.
3.2.1 Contract with Not -Yet-Born People and Keeping a Contract
It is possible for individuals of the same generation to enter into a contract, but how can
this agreement be passed on to future generations without being changed? For example, if
people living today were to agree on sustainable development, how could future
generations be bound to this agreement? Another relevant question, is it possible for us to
enter into a contract with people who are not yet born?
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There is, of course, an obvious problem with entering into a contract with not-yet-
born people—they are not here to sign the agreement. However, this physical limitation
of entering into a contract with not-yet-born people can be sidestepped, according to
contractarian theory, since a contract can be made between several existing generations
with future generations in mind. 32 For example, I could enter into a contract with my
grandparents' and parents' generation, since we are all part of contemporary generations.
According to contractarian theory, I would only agree to a contract if I thought it would
be accepted by or beneficial for my future children and their generation. Philosopher
David Gauthier expresses this chain of connection between generations in the following
way: "No matter when one lives, one should expect the same relative benefits from
interaction with one's fellows as were enjoyed by one's predecessors and as will be
enjoyed in turn by one's successors." 33
Although it makes sense to speak of contemporaries entering into agreements or
contracts with one another, it makes no sense to speak of a contractual obligation towards
future people, since there is nothing that future people, apart from our immediate
descendants, can do for us in return. People in the future cannot harm or punish us for
adopting policies now that are sustainable or not. Contemporary generations are therefore
superior to future generations since they decide on various policies that determine, for
example, how resources should be distributed, and what should be conserved, and all
these policies will ultimately determine how many and who these future people will be.
A contract implies obligations, and therefore, if a contract were to concern
sustainable development, all generations that entered into the contract would agree to
move in a more sustainable direction. They would do so because they believed that they
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would benefit from this contract. However, once the contract has been implemented, why
should one continue to uphold it? Today, the motivation to enter into a contract of
sustainable development is that we fear that if every generation depletes resources the
way we are doing today, then all generations, including ours, will be worse off. Yet, this
is not, and cannot be, the reason for remaining committed to the contract, because we
have already enjoyed our predecessors' savings and acts of conservation, and we cannot
enjoy them again. Thus, from a contractarian perspective we must obligate all generations
to remain in the contract of sustainable development if we want to maintain the contract.
But what would force people now and in the future to abide by the contract?
Within a single generation, or between contemporary generations, this is brought
about by a sense of reciprocity. For example, laws are contracts that people in a country
or state are expected to obey. If someone were to violate a law, then he or she would be
punished. Most people would therefore abide by the contract out of fear of punishment,
which is in essence a fear of reciprocity. In the intergenerational context this direct
reciprocity is absent and therefore the motive for maintaining a contract is lost.'
However, one could consider emotionally charged posterity arguments, such as the chain
of connections between generations, as a kind of reciprocity between generations?' The
argument would go along these lines: I would stick to a contract, such as planting a new
tree for every tree I cut down, and I would do so out of love for my children's
grandchildren. My future children and their children, and so on, will love me back and
enjoy the trees that I have planted, just as much as I love my greatgrandfather who
planted the trees that I am cutting down now. According to contractarian theory, this tight
chain of connection between generations creates reciprocity.
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De-Shalit argues that there are two interpretations of reciprocity in the
intergenerational context. 36 One is that reciprocity exists when there is a mutual
advantage and the other is when there is some kind of fair play. Considering at the first,
contractarians might defend the idea of mutual benefit between generations by arguing
the following: I would only agree to a contract with my parents' and grandparents'
generations if I thought the contract would benefit my future children and their
generation. Using this argument, reciprocity could also apply between generations that
are even further apart since it just involves adding more links to the chain of generations.
This argument might seem plausible between generations in the near future, but
the argument is not convincing with respect to remote future generations. Imagine the
following conversation between generations C and E concerning two contracts P and Q,
which also involves generation A, B and D: 37
Generation C (to E): "Let's cooperate and make an agreement Q."
Generation E (to C): "But you had a better agreement with generation A
and generation B. You had agreement P and I want
P too."
Generation C (to E): "Well, sorry. Take it or leave it. I would benefit
more by adopting agreement Q, and since I have
already benefitted from P, I would actually be fine
without any agreement at all."
E would want to reach an agreement, since according to contractarian theory it is
better for E to cooperate than not to do so. Suppose that generations C, D, and E reach an
agreement. This agreement is not guaranteed to be the same agreement that generation C
had with generations A and B, which was agreement P. In fact, it is more rational for
generation C to agree only to Q, because C will benefit more from Q than from P. If the
agreement between C, D, and E is Q, then contractarian theory fails to support an ongoing
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contract, since the contract has changed from P to Q. This leads to the conclusion that it is
not possible to justify moral obligations to generations in the remote future, since
contracts are likely to change over time. If, on the other hand, the agreement between C,
D, and E is P, then there will not be any genuine mutual advantage since generation C
will be better off with agreement Q. The conclusion in this case is that mutual-advantage
reciprocity would not exist for remote future generations, and therefore the motivation to
stick to the contract is lost.
The other type of reciprocity in the intergenerational context is the idea of fair
play between generations. Fair play works when it is applied in a direct fashion. Take for
instance, the following scenario: Claire, the roommate of my hairdresser, Robert, is an
airplane stewardess. He cuts her hair, and she gives him free plane rides—they practice
fair play. However, in the intergenerational context, fair play is indirect since it involves
two groups of nonexisting persons—past and future generations. In the case of
sustainable development, fair play would not be relevant in an intergenerational context.
Previous generations have been polluting and damaging the environment and have left the
earth to us, contemporary generations, in a miserable state. According to the fair play
argument, we should treat the earth just as badly as previous generations have and should
continue to leave the earth in a miserable state for future generations. So if we adopted
sustainable development, it would be as if we were giving something to the next
generation, without receiving anything from our previous generation. The notion of
reciprocity as fair play is too vague and, in my opinion, does not apply in the
intergenerational context and definitely does not apply in the case of sustainable
development.
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I believe that in order to make a contract work over several generations,
contractarian theory has to be able to show that there is some kind of equality of power
between generations so that an equilibrium between generations can be established.
3.2.2 Equality of Power between Generations
The inequality of power between generations might seem evident: people far into the
future cannot harm us in any way. They also would not have the power to stop us from
polluting, or from living in an unsustainable way. However, according to contractarian
theory, there is an equality of power between generations that creates moral obligations
that are just as strong as those obligations that are shared by people living together today.
The contractarian theory of equality of power is based on the idea that individuals, no
matter when they live, will be roughly similar in physical and mental powers, or at least
have comparable capacities. 38 The contractarian might agree that contemporary
generations are superior to future generations in some ways, but that the latter have
superior powers in other ways. The argument is that future generations will have power
over more distant future generations. Hence a kind of equality of power will exist. Let's
consider the following example: 39
The difference in power between two generations, say, C and D, is neutralized by
and compensated by the difference in powers between generations D and E, which is
neutralized by the difference between E and F, and so on. However, if generation A is
superior to B, which is compensated by B being superior to C, then, according to this
argument, A must be superior to C, which is compensated by C being superior to E. Now
suppose that we have a history of eight generations, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H. What
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would be the situation of one particular generation? Let's examine generation F. A is
superior in power to F, B is superior in power to F, C is superior in power to F, D is
superior in power to F, E is superior in power to F, F is superior in power to G, and F is
superior in power to H. In this example, only the superiority of D and E to F would be
compensated. Suppose n is the number of generations in history. If n is an even number,
then the last n/2 generations will suffer a lack of equality of powers. However, if n is an
odd number, then the last (n-1)/2 generations will suffer a lack of equality of powers.
This chain of relations between generations, as shown in the above example,
cannot replace equality in power in the intergenerational context. There can therefore be
no equality of power between generations that live at different times.° "We [current
people] and they [future people] are not positioned in such a way as to be able to
reciprocate with each other concerning the constituent ideas and controlling aims of any
associations or enterprises which we jointly participate in, or endure."'
People of contemporary generations, are less vulnerable than those of future
generations, since we have the power to shape the future even though the equality of
powers at any given time between existing generations might be comparable. This
vulnerability of future generations is acknowledged in contractarian theory by what
Rawls calls a "just savings principle."
3.2.3 Just Savings Principle
To deal with this conflict of equitability over generations, Rawls suggests that all
generations should adopt a "just savings principle."' This principle is intended to
compensate future generations for the damage that contemporary generations do to the
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environment. Rawls makes it clear that the purpose of the principle is not only to pass on
wealth, but also to allow the opportunity for full realization. The idea of a just savings
principle goes hand in hand with the concept of sustainable development. In order to meet
the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs, we need to adopt a just savings principle. However, an obvious problem
with putting sustainable development into practice is deciding how to distribute and
divide finite resources with a growing population and an uncertain future.
Rawls does not tackle the problem of determining how much saving is fair.
However, others have indicated that we should leave the earth to future generations in the
state that we inherit it from previous generations, or at least that we should share common
goods or primary goods in equal proportions with future generations. 43 A generation
would want to inherit the common patrimony of the planet in as good a condition as it has
been for any previous generations. This requires that each generation pass the planet on in
no worse condition than they received it and that they provide equitable access to its
resources and benefits. This might seem to be fair or just to future generations, but would
people really be willing to agree to such a contract? To distribute primary goods in an
equitable fashion between generations is difficult to put into practice, especially because,
as I discussed above, our perceptions of needs and primary goods change over time.
I believe that contractarian theory must be able to provide us with more
convincing arguments as to why we should agree to a contract. The "original position," in
which we do not know our physical and social circumstances, allowing for the adoption
of a contract based on the just saving principle, is not a convincing or sufficient
motivation for adopting such a principle. I believe that many people would find it hard to
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look beyond their physical and social circumstances in deciding on policies. De-Shalit,
who argues for a theory based on a transgenerational community, tries to provide us with
the argument that our moral obligation should grow out of a concern for the community
rather than an abstract original position.
3.2.4 Transgenerational Community
The theory of transgenerational community is that our moral obligation to future
generations is derived from a sense of a community instead of an emphasis on a contract
between generations."
A community usually means a group of interacting members. They might live or
work together, have commercial relationships, experience the same nature or culture, etc.
However, these kinds of communities only extend over a few generations. De-Shalit
argues for a community that extends further, including several generations into the future.
In this community, just as people think of the past as part of "themselves," so should they
also regard the future as part of "themselves." One's self-awareness is related to one's
community, both in the present and in the future. We have moral obligations to future
generations, and since these obligations derive from the community that constitutes our
"selves," these obligations should be as strong as any other moral obligation shared by
contemporary community members. Being a member of this transgenerational
community is like being a member of any community or organization. All community
members are given the opportunity to reflect on the community's values and try either to
alter them or leave the community and join another.
71
The theory of transgenerational community, that de-Shalit advocates is similar, in
my opinion, to contractarian theory, since one could say that everyone who agrees on a
contract is also a member of the transgenerational community. De-Shalit further shares
the contractarian view that there is a close relationship between generations, which
creates moral similarity. However, being a member of a community is more flexible than
entering into a contract, which has its advantages as well as its disadvantages.
The main disadvantage, is that the transgenerational community cannot extend far
into the future. Our moral obligations to future generations fade as the distance between
generations increases. Another weakness is that the psychological idea of self-
transcendence and the idea of moral similarity with future generations are simply
traditional emotional posterity arguments, which are not, as I discussed in the
introduction of this chapter, sufficient motivation for enacting and expressing moral
obligations.
Even if the transgenerational community theory fails to provide us with arguments
that show that we have moral obligations to future generations, it does provide us with
the argument that we have moral obligations to communities. This is the advantage of
transgenerational community theory. The transgenerational community relies upon us,
contemporary people, to enact and adopt policies such as sustainable development.
Transgenerational community theory allows us to motivate adoption of sustainable
development out of a moral obligation to contemporary communities.
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CHAPTER 4
WE OWE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TO COMMUNITIES
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.
Aldo Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac, 1949.
Sustainable development is only retained because it is perceived to be legitimate.
However, its legitimacy ultimately rests on the perception that it is ethically justified. The
problem is that sustainable development is a policy that has been developed without a
clear ethical framework, and without such, it is not truly justified.
In the previous chapter, I discussed whether sustainable development, as
described in the Bruntland report, could be justified according to the frameworks laid out
in utilitarian and contractarian theories, especially if these moral philosophies could show
that we have a moral obligation to future generations. My conclusion was that neither
utilitarianism nor contractarian theory could show that we have such a moral obligation to
future generations. Therefore, they cannot serve as ethical frameworks for sustainable
development as it is defined in the Bruntland report.
In this chapter, I will discuss the possibilities for a nonanthropocentric ethical
framework of sustainable development, but still in terms of the Bruntland report.
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4.1 Moving Beyond Anthropocentrism
The ethical outlook of the Bruntland report is predominantly anthropocentric. It assumes
that it is for the sake of humans that we should adopt a sustainable use of natural
resources and the environment—that is, for the sake of people living now and in the
future. According to this perspective, nature is ascribed instrumental value in relation to
human needs and other human interests.
However, a nonanthropocentric perspective appears in one or two places in the
Bruntland report, as exemplified by the following passage:
If needs are to be met on a sustainable basis, the Earth's natural resource
base must be conserved and enhanced. Major changes in policies will be
needed to cope with the industrial world's current high level of
consumption, the increases in consumption needed to meet minimum
standards in developing countries, and expected population growth.
However, the case for the conservation of nature should not rest only with
development goals. It is part of our moral obligation to other living beings
and future generations.'
This quote opens up the possibility of a nonanthropocentric ethical framework for
sustainable development, since our moral obligation is extended to include other living
beings. Gro Harlem Bruntland took this further in her opening speech at the 1988 World
Conference on the Changing Atmosphere with a call for a "new holistic ethic in which
economic growth and environmental protection go hand-in-hand around the world."'
On June 5, 1997, marking the 25 th anniversary of the Stockholm Declaration and
the 5 th anniversary of the Rio Declaration, the "Seoul Declaration on Environmental
Ethics" was agreed on in Seoul, Korea.' The Seoul Declaration was established as a
framework of ideals, principles, and guidelines to sustain life on earth.
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Earth's Whole-Life-System refers to a totality in which human beings,
together with other life forms, natural elements and forces, coexist
interdependently as a cohesive entity—the viability of the Whole-Life-
System is essential to and dependent upon the very existence and integrity
of all of its constituent components, and no species has an exclusive right
to Earth's environment. All human decisions ought to be made and
implemented on the premise that the existence of all life, including human
life, can be sustained only when the integrity and wellbeing of the Whole-
Life-System is preserved.'
It is difficult to tell if Gro Harlem Brutland really meant that a "new holistic
ethic" should be a nonanthropocentric ethic. However, the Seoul Declaration quite clearly
states that sustainable development should be based on an ethical framework that views
the world as an interconnected whole, in which the environment as "Earth's Whole-Life-
System" has a moral standing of its own.
In the next section, I will discuss an ethical framework for sustainable
development that embraces the Seoul Declaration and my interpretation of Bruntland's
"new holistic ethic." I will argue for a holistic ethical framework that is based on Aldo
Leopold's community concept and his land ethic.
4.2 Aldo Leopold's Community and Land Ethic
While working as a government forester, Aldo Leopold embraced, in his early years, the
resource conservation ethic developed by Gifford Pinchot, the first director of the U.S.
Forest Service. According to Pinchot, the qualities found in nature could be considered as
natural resources for humans.' The goal of the proper use of natural resources, according
to this conservation ethic, is to provide the greatest good for the greatest number of
people for the longest possible time. However, Leopold rejected this kind of
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utilitarianism later in his career since it viewed the land merely as a collection of
individual goods that could be used by humans in many different ways. Leopold
eventually came to the conclusion that the most important goal of land management is to
maintain the health of natural ecosystems and ecological processes. Leopold's synthesis
was published in his classic essay "The Land Ethic."'
In "The Land Ethic," a holistic view is presented, in which the good of
ecosystems, or communities, as a whole is considered, rather than the satisfaction of
human needs and preferences, which was the focus of the resource conservation ethic.
Even if the primary goal of Leopold's land ethic is the good of the whole community, the
individuals within the community are still important. Each individual has an inherent
value, and it is the individuals that together make up the community. "In short, a land
ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain
member and citizen of it."' However, humans are not the only members of this more
holistic community—animals, plants, and other natural entities are also included. The
central ideas of Leopold's land ethic can be summarized by two major positions: (1) an
ethical consideration of nonhumans, and (2) a recognition of an ecosystemic community.'
4.2.1 The Extension of Ethical Consideration to Nonhumans
One fundamental feature of Leopold's land ethic is the extension of direct ethical
considerability from humans to nonhuman natural entities. As such, the land ethic creates
obligations over and above human self-interest. The land should be valued for its own
sake, regardless of the advantage or disadvantage to humans. The land, which includes all
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species and natural entities, has an intrinsic value. The land ethic does not, however,
accord to animals, plants, soil, etc. the same rights as humans. Humans have a moral
obligation towards each other—a social morality that we do not have towards
nonhumans. However, the land ethic extends our morality so that we have to take the land
under moral consideration.
Leopold begins the Land Ethic with the story of Odysseus, who hanged a dozen
female slaves after returning from the wars of Troy. Odysseus killed the slaves because
he suspected they had engaged in misconduct while he was away, and he justified his
action by arguing that the slaves were his property and therefore his to do with as he
wished. Leopold drew an analogy between the status of the slaves in the story and the
current status of the land. According to Leopold, we have to extend our moral community
to include the land, just as we have in the past extended our moral community to include
slaves. In Leopold's words: "The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the
community to include soils, water, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land."'
4.2.2 Ecosystemic Community
The concept of community that Leopold uses is much larger than the human-based
community. At the time, Leopold was being influenced by new ideas from the field of
ecology. The concept of a biological community is a basic ecological concept meaning a
community of species that occupies a particular area, and their interactions. A biological
community together with its associated physical environment is termed an "ecosystem."
In Leopold's community, humans are just members, or citizens, of the biological
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community, and since the physical environment is also part of this community, it has
alternatively been called an ecosystemic community."'
The primary goal of Leopold's land ethic is a condition that is good for the entire
community, not just for the individuals within the community. "A thing is right when it
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong
when it tends otherwise.' As I mentioned above, even if the primary goal of the land
ethic is the good of the whole community, the individuals within the community continue
to be important. If the individuals are preserved as well as natural processes, then the
beauty and stability is maintained within the community.
4.2.3 Leopold's Land Ethic as a Framework for Sustainable Development
The symbol of sustainable development, figure 1, presents sustainable development as the
intersection of three community spheres that support humanity. In order to move in a
more sustainable direction, we must find a balance between the economy, society
(including global equity, ethnicity, cultures and religions), and the environment. To
achieve this balance, each of these spheres must be valued both on its own and as an
interdependent part of the whole.
Figure 1. Sustainable development is achieved through a balance between the three
spheres of the economy, society, and the environment.
82
If an anthropocentric ethical framework is used to justify sustainable
development, then this balance is upset, since the environment is given an instrumental
value, which is totally dependent on the other two spheres. In chapter three, I discussed
the traditional moral philosophies of utilitarianism and contractarian theory. Here I will
use both theories to show how anthropocentrism fails to support sustainable development.
Utilitarianism focuses on maximizing happiness. I have already shown that it is
lacking in arguments that support moral obligation to future generations. Utilitarianism
sees an obligation to make only those people happy who are living now, or at least to
reduce their suffering. If it makes people happy to care about future people and the
environment, then let's adopt policies that give people this satisfaction. We could
consider sustainable development to be a policy that has been adopted because it makes
people feel good from a utilitarian point of view. However, the balance between the
economy, society, and the environment is only an imaginary balance, since peoples'
needs and preferences can easily be manipulated or taught, as I discussed in the previous
chapter. It is only when the environment is given intrinsic value that we can actually
achieve a balance, because only then is each of the community spheres given a value of
its own, in addition to their values as interdependent parts of the whole.
One might think it is possible to extend utilitarianism to include the environment,
so that the goal would be to maximize the overall happiness of the three community
spheres of the economy, society, and the environment. Philosopher Peter Singer
advocates extending utilitarianism. However, he claims that utilitarianism can only be
extended to include all sentient creatures, that is, all animals, humans included, that can
suffer or feel pain.12
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Contractarian theory, on the other hand, cannot expand its morality to include
either animals nor the environment as a whole, since it is impossible to enter into a
contract with them/it. 13 Rawls's "just savings principle," a principle to save resources and
environments for the future, is only relevant as long as there are sufficient grounds for a
moral obligation to future generations. In chapter three, I discussed contractarian theory
and its underlying assumptions. I concluded that these assumptions are either too vague
or not applicable with respect to future generations. This undermines the motivation for
adopting a just savings principle and therefore also undermines adopting sustainable
development within a contractarian framework.
Leopold's land ethic, on the other hand, is a suitable ethical framework to support
sustainable development, since its morality is extended to include the environment. It is
our responsibility as humans to take soils, water, plants, and animals—or collectively, the
land—under moral consideration. The goal of sustainable development, according to
Leopold's land ethic, is the good of the whole community, but the parts that make up the
community—i.e. the three community spheres of the economy, society, and the
environment—should be respected both as individual parts as well as interconnected parts
of the whole.
J. Baird Callicott is a philosopher who advocates an environmental ethic based on
Leoopold's land ethic. 14 Callicott gives an example of a sustainable community in the
South American Amazon rain forest that has this kind of balance between the community
spheres. 15 The Kayapo Indians live in this Amazon community, where they fish, hunt,
gather and cultivate their land in a sustainable manner. Using complex cycles of
agriculture the Kayapo Indians manage to cultivate a forest clearing for nearly ten years,
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instead of merely two or three years, which is the usual among Euro-Brazillian peasants.
After a decade, the forest clearing is not abandoned by the Kayapo Indians, rather the
plots are used for planting first fast-growing, short-lived plants, such as banana, and then
later long-lived trees like Brazil nut, coconut and oil palms. This kind of silviculture
benefits many species, and the biodiversity is often enhanced in the area around the forest
clearing. The way that the Kayapo Indians live and use the land is a good example of a
community that balances the community spheres of the economy, society, and the
environment. The Kayapo Indians use their land in an economically efficient manner, and
the community is able to live in a traditional way, in accord with its indigenous culture as
well as maintain the natural ecosystems and rich biodiversity where they live.
However, the challenge for sustainable development is in most of the other
communities around the world, which do not practice the community balance described
in the example of the Kayapo Indians. Perhaps the greatest imbalance lies between the
people of the North and those of the South. Not only are the problems in the North and
South different in many ways, as I discussed earlier in chapter two, but sustainable
development, as well as other environmental policies, have a tendency to export Northern
ideals of development and environmentalism. Philosopher Ramachandra Guha has
written a "Third World critique" of what happens in the South when Northern
environmentalism is introduced.' In the North, people enjoy the material benefits of an
expanding economy as well as the aesthetic benefits of nature in wilderness reserves.
"The wilderness and civilization mutually coexist in an internally coherent whole." 17
However, in the South, industrial development of natural resources combined with the
setting aside of wilderness areas has often created environmental disasters and human
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tragedies. Guha further points out that in India, for example, the setting aside of nature
reserves has resulted in a transfer of resources from poor to rich people. The poor had to
leave their homelands when they were made part of the reserves, and only wealthy
foreigners and the income-elite in India could afford to enjoy the wilderness experience.
Even if Leopold's land ethic is a Northern philosophy, it differs from much of
Northern environmentalism since it addresses the inequity that exists between the North
and South. Developing countries would be able, within Leopold's framework, to exploit
natural resources, if sustainably managed, as long as the overall community would gain
by it. Furthermore, the land ethic is a nonanthropocentric ethic, which, according to Eric
Katz and Lauren Oechsli, does not tend to fuel the North-South conflict as much as an
anthropocentric ethical framework, which could "evoke historical forces of economic
imperialism."' With a nonanthropocentric ethical framework, it is possible to motivate
people regarding the preservation of, for example, the Amazon rain forest, regardless of
the benefits or costs to human beings. However, Katz and Oechsli agree with Guha that
any justifiable environmental policy must include solutions to the problems of inequity
between the North and the South. "We [North] have outstanding debts, both to the
nations of the Third World and to nature itself.'
4.3 Concluding Remarks
It is my position in this thesis that for sustainable development to be accepted and
implemented a fundamental change in our values and beliefs is necessary. However, this
change has to be realistic, pragmatic, and ethically justifiable in order to be achieved. It is
the way we perceive our relationship with the natural world that first has to take a "giant
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step." We have to be willing to give the environment an intrinsic value, so that the three
community spheres of economy, society, and environment can be valued in and of
themselves and as an integrated parts of the whole. Only with a holistic ethical
framework, such as one that is based on Leopold's land ethic, can we truly justify
sustainable development as a development strategy that is consistent with social and
ecological realties. I believe that sustainable development based on this ethical
framework has the potential of being a "giant step" for the progress of our civilization.
While sustainable development is global in its vision, it works, at the same time, at
various civic and geographic levels and attempts to include within its scope many
different serious social and environmental problems.
The strength of Leopold's land ethic as a model for sustainable development is
that this framework is simple, pragmatic, and flexible. The balance between the
community spheres in support of humanity illustrated in figure 1 captures the essence of a
sustainable development based on Leopold's land ethic.
This kind of sustainable development is pragmatic in the sense that many various
groups with different views can work together on solving serious environmental and
social problems in communities at different geographic and civic levels. 2° Callicott argues
that Leopold's "harmony-of-people-with-nature conservation" is uniting
environmentalists and developers.' On one hand, Leopold's ideas absorb Pinchot's
resource conservation ethic, since Leopold endorses human economic use and
development of the land. However, the human use of the land should be compatible with
the land's ecological health and integrity. To maintain this ecological health and integrity,
sustainable management of natural resources is not enough. It has to be combined with
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the preservation of wilderness areas as well. Thus, the land ethic also endorses the
preservation movement led by John Muir." Callicott writes, "Leopold's harmony-of-
people-with-nature philosophy of conservation transcends both Pinchot's and Muir's
philosophies to an extent that goes beyond the conceptual distinction between people and
nature that both Pinchot and Muir uncritically perpetuate.”" This kind of pragmatism is
far from being a relic from the past, it offers a dynamic approach to questions of human
conduct, social values, scientific inquiry, aesthetics, and the environment. 24
The land ethic model is flexible in that its goal is to seek the best for the whole
community, which is a balance between economical, social, and environmental goals.
However, this might not always mean the different community spheres are accorded
equal worth. The specific value of one of these spheres depends upon its relationship to
the community as a whole. For example, the economic sphere might be stressed in
developing countries, whereas the environmental sphere might be the focus in more
industrialized communities.
Another advantage of using Leopold's land ethic as a framework for sustainable
development is that it does not necessarily conflict with the Bruntland report's
description of sustainable development, which itself points toward a nonanthropocentric
ethical framework. Furthermore, the Bruntland report supports the notion that sustainable
development is a balance between the economy, society, and the environment. 25
However, since the moral emphasis in the Bruntland report is that of obligation to future
generations, I would like to propose an alternative definition which puts less emphasis on
such an obligation and instead focuses on the moral obligation that contemporary people
share towards their communities:
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Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable—to ensure that
it meets the long-term needs of communities. Our moral obligation is to
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of these communities, which
are founded on a balance between economy, society and environment.
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Environmental Ethics & Policy Book, Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce, eds. 2nd
edition (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998), p. 184-198.
15 J. Baird Callicott, "Benevolent Symbiosis: The Philosophy of Conservation
Reconstructed," in Earth Summit Ethic: Toward a Reconstructive Postmodern
Philosophy of Environmental Education, J. Baird Callicott and Fernando J.R. da Rocha,
eds. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), p. 152-3.
16 Ramachandra Guha, "Radical American Environmentalism: A Third World Critique,"
Environmental Ethics 11 (1989), p. 71-83.
17 Ibid., p. 79.
"Eric Katz and Lauren Oechsli, "Moving Beyond Anthropocentrism: Environmental
Ethics, Development, and the Amazon," in Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and
Natural Community, p. 149-162.
19
 Ibid, p. 160.
20
 Pragmatism is defined as a "method of philosophy in which the truth of a position is
measured by its correspondence with experimental results and by its practical outcome.
Thus pragmatists hold that the truth is modified as discoveries are made and that it is
relative to time and place and purpose of inquiry." Paul Legasse, ed., The Concise
Columbia Encyclopedia, 3rd edition (Boston: Houghtin Mifflin, 1995).
21
 Callicott, "Benevolent Symbiosis: The Philosophy of Conservation Reconstructed," p.
150-2.
22 John Muir (1838-1914) is the father of the American wilderness preservation
movement. He founded the Sierra Club (a NGO) and advocated for preserving wilderness
areas in national parks. Muir's wilderness philosophy was founded on aesthetics. He saw
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nature as a healing escape from urban industrial society. For a discussion about John
Muir and his work see, John Opie, Nature's Nation: An Environmental History of the
United States, (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998), p. 386-391.
23 Callicott, "Benevolent Symbiosis: The Philosophy of Conservation Reconstructed," p.
152.
24
 Pragmatism emerged as an American response to empiricism, and presented a re-
conception of the nature of experience. American pragmatism was developed by the 19 th -
century American philosophers Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey and
George Herbert Mead, among others. For a comprehensive introduction to American
pragmatism see, Sandra B. Rosenthal, et al, Classical American Pragmatism,
(Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1999). For an introduction to American
pragmatism in the context of the environment see, Kelly A. Parker, "Pragmatism and
Environmental Thought," in Environmental Pragmatism, Andrew Light and Eric Katz,
eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
25
 The World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future. p.
65.
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